Urjigdar München Haupbahnhof-iin newsstand deer minii neleed deer profile hiij baisan Robert Kaplan-ii Foreign Affairs deer garsan Hyatadiin geopolitics-iin talaar mash sonirholtoy niitleliig olj uzev (PDF). Hervee heterhii urt sanagdval IHT deerh tovchilson op-ed-iig endees unshij bolno. Mun tuunchlen husvel endees Kaplan-ii audio yariltslagiig sonsooroy.
Niitleliin yurunhii sanaa ni gevel Hyatadiin geopolitics-iin bodlogo ni tsaashdaa Amerikiinh shig ideology deer suurilaj bus harin udruus udurt usun nemegdej bui hun amiin heregtseeg hangah tuuhii ed, erchim huchnii eh uusveriig medeldee oruulj avah ermelzel deer tulguurlah bolno. Ene ch utgaaraa Hyatadiin ergen toiron dahi jijig ulsuud tednii tuuhii ediig niiluuleh, orond ni belen buteegdehuun importloh zamaar nuluulliin bused ni oroh yum. Ene nuhtsuld Amerikiin tsaashdiin Azi tiv deh geopolitics-iin bodlogo Hyatadiin nuluulliig ene bus nutagt herhen togtoon barih ve gedeg deer tuvlurnu.
Even where China's borders are secure, the country's very shape makes it appear as though it is dangerously incomplete--as if parts of an original Greater China had been removed. China's northern border wraps around Mongolia, a giant territory that looks like it was once bitten out of China's back. Mongolia has one of the world's lowest population densities and is now being threatened demographically by an urban Chinese civilization next door. Having once conquered Outer Mongolia to gain access to more cultivable land, Beijing is poised to conquer Mongolia again, after a fashion, in order to satisfy its hunger for the country's oil, coal, uranium, and rich, empty grasslands. Chinese mining companies have been seeking large stakes in Mongolia's underground assets because unchecked industrialization and urbanization have turned China into the world's leading consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin, and iron ore; China's share of the world's metal consumption has jumped from ten percent to 25 percent since the late 1990s. With Tibet, Macao, and Hong Kong already under Beijing's control, China's dealings with Mongolia will be a model for judging the degree to which China harbors imperialist intentions.
North of Mongolia and of China's three northeastern provinces lies Russia's Far East region, a numbing vastness twice the size of Europe with a meager and shrinking population. The Russian state expanded its reach into this area during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, while China was weak. Now, China is strong, and the Russian government's authority is nowhere as feeble as it is in the eastern third of the country. Just across the border from the roughly seven million Russians who live in the Russian Far East -- a figure that could fall as low as 4.5 million by 2015 -- in the three abutting Chinese provinces, live some 100 million Chinese: the population density is 62 times as great on the Chinese side as on the Russian side. Chinese migrants have been filtering into Russia, settling in large numbers in the city of Chita, north of Mongolia, and elsewhere in the region. Resource acquisition is the principal goal of China's foreign policy everywhere, and Russia's sparsely populated Far East has large reserves of natural gas, oil, timber, diamonds, and gold. "Moscow is wary of large numbers of Chinese settlers moving into this region, bringing timber and mining companies in their wake," David Blair, a correspondent for London's Daily Telegraph, wrote last summer.
As with Mongolia, the fear is not that the Chinese army will one day invade or formally annex the Russian Far East. It is that Beijing's creeping demographic and corporate control over the region -- parts of which China held briefly during the Qing dynasty -- is steadily increasing. During the Cold War, border disputes between China and the Soviet Union brought hundreds of thousands of troops to this Siberian back of beyond and sometimes ignited into clashes. In the late 1960s, these tensions led to the Sino-Soviet split. Geography could drive China and Russia apart, since their current alliance is purely tactical. This could benefit the United States. In the 1970s, the Nixon administration was able to take advantage of the rift between Beijing and Moscow to make an opening toward China. In the future, with China the greater power, the United States might conceivably partner with Russia in a strategic alliance to balance against the Middle Kingdom.
Current reading: Stefan Halper - The Beijing Consensus (Not so impressive, but quite interesting: Perhaps market authoritarianism is the way we should develop?)
Addendum: LSE Asia Forum + Tim Harford writes,
China now exports every six hours as much as it did in the whole of 1978.