Twenty-First-Century Intermarium

The Twenty-First-Century Geopolitical Strategy for Eurasia accomplishes Pilsudski’s Prometheism and Intermarum [sic] on a grand scale, by empowering all the small states of Eurasia from Georgia to Mongolia and seeking to integrate them and bring them closer by propagating Western institutions in an Intermarum-type Western-oriented grouping—not between Germany and Russia, but between the great Eurasian powers of the twenty-first century: Russia and China. While the fundamentals of this strategy are not new, they form a unique overall approach to the current challenges facing Western policy makers. The Twenty-First-Century Geopolitical Strategy for Eurasia advocates for greater Western involvement in Eurasia than ever before. It argues that Western involvement and integration is not only possible but strategically imperative, not just in the Black Sea region, but also around the Caspian and Central/Inner Asia. The strategy departs from the traditional emphasis placed on the future of Ukraine and its schismatic domestic politics. Rather, it links Western efforts in Europe, Russia, Afghanistan, China, and Iran into a strategic whole to form an overarching purpose for Western institutions and governments. It is neither hopelessly isolationist nor vaingloriously imperialistic. It is aggressively realistic, informed by geographic constants and the urgent need for the West to renew itself in its own defense. In short, it is a wise strategy—something sorely lacking in the Western attitude towards Eurasia today.

from Alexandros Petersen's "The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West" (2011)